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1 The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views and 
opinions of the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board. 
In November 2003, the National Transportation Safety Board recommended that the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) convene a panel of aircraft design, operations, and human factors specialists to examine the 
feasibility of requiring the installation of low airspeed alerting devices on airplanes operating commercially under 14 
C.F.R. Parts 121 and 135. The Board further recommended that if the panel determined such a requirement to be 
feasible, the FAA should establish requirements for low-airspeed alert systems.  This paper discusses the reasoning 
behind these recommendations, explores relevant accident history from the Safety Board’s investigative records, and 
discusses shortcomings of an approach to cockpit design that relies on flight crew monitoring and artificial stall 
warnings for avoidance of low airspeed related accidents.  Potential benefits and concerns associated with the 




On October 25, 2002, a Raytheon King Air A100 on 
a non-scheduled Part 135 flight crashed 1.8 miles 
short of the runway threshold during a VOR 
approach to the Eveleth-Virginia Municipal Airport, 
Eveleth, Minnesota.  Radar and weather data 
indicated that the flight crew experienced difficulty 
intercepting the approach course and performed a 
steep, fast approach, which probably required them to 
reduce engine power to very low levels.  As the crew 
descended, their airspeed slowly and steadily 
decreased until it fell below recommended approach 
speed.  Airspeed continued to decrease at a rate of 
approximately 1 knot per second for the last 48 
seconds of flight.  As the airplane reached the 
minimum descent altitude in the landing 
configuration, with its airspeed having decreased to 
near the calculated stall speed, the airplane suddenly 
rolled left, descended steeply, and impacted terrain.  
All occupants were killed, including the late U.S. 
Senator Paul Wellstone.  The Safety Board found that 
icing was not a factor, and determined that the 
probable cause of this accident was “the flight crew’s 
failure to maintain adequate airspeed, which led to an 
aerodynamic stall from which they did not recover” 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2003). 
 
In its final report on this accident, adopted on 
November 18, 2003, the Safety Board urged the FAA 
to convene a panel of aircraft design, aviation 
operations, and aviation human factors specialists, 
including representatives from the National Air and 
Space Administration to determine whether a 
requirement for the installation of low airspeed alert 
systems in airplanes engaged in commercial 
operations under 14 Code of Federal Regulations 
Parts 121 and 135 would be feasible (NTSB 
Recommendation No. A-03-53).  The Board further 
recommended that if the panel determined such a 
requirement to be feasible, the FAA should establish 
requirements for low-airspeed alert systems (NTSB 
Recommendation No. A-03-54).  This paper 
discusses the reasoning behind the Safety Board’s 
recommendations, explores relevant accident history 
from the Board’s investigative records, and discusses 
shortcomings of the current cockpit design 
philosophy relying on flight crew monitoring and 
artificial stall warnings to avoid low airspeed related 
accidents.  Potential benefits and concerns associated 
with the installation of a new kind of low airspeed 




Airspeed is a basic measure of airplane performance 
monitored by flight crews.  Angle of attack is the 
angle between the chord line of an airplane’s wings 
and the oncoming relative wind.  All other things 
held constant, when airspeed decreases, angle of 
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attack must be increased to maintain lift.  However, if 
angle of attack is increased too much, critical angle 
of attack can be exceeded, smooth airflow over the 
wing will be disrupted, and an aerodynamic stall 
results.  A stall can occur at any airspeed, attitude, or 
power setting, however, if airspeed is allowed to 
decrease too much, a stall will reliably be produced. 
 
Practicing aerodynamic stalls, and their recovery, is a 
routine part of pilot training.  However, inadvertent 
stalls can be dangerous.  This is especially true 
during the takeoff, climb, approach, and landing 
phases of flight.  Inadvertent stalls are more likely 
during these phases because operating airspeeds are 
lower and stall speed margins are reduced.  In 
addition, lower altitudes make stall recovery less 
certain.  Flight crew airspeed monitoring is the first 
line of defense against inadvertent stalls.  To guard 
against them, flight crews are trained to monitor 
airspeed instruments and to maintain target airspeeds. 
 
Stall warnings provide a second line of defense 
against inadvertent stalls, serving as a backup to crew 
monitoring.  Federal airworthiness standards (14 
C.F.R. Parts 23 and 25) require the presence of a 
clear and distinctive warning capable of alerting the 
crew of an impending stall.  This warning cannot 
require the crew’s visual attention inside the cockpit, 
and must begin 5 or more knots above stalling speed 
for normal and commuter category airplanes.  For 
transport category airplanes, it must begin at least 5 
knots or 5 percent above stalling speed (whichever 
value is greater).2  If the aerodynamic qualities of an 
aircraft (e.g., buffeting) do not provide a clear and 
distinctive warning meeting these requirements, an 
artificial stall warning must be installed.  Flight crews 
are trained to begin stall recovery procedures if a stall 
warning occurs during normal flight operations. 
 
The widespread introduction of swept-wing jet 
aircraft in commercial aviation in the 1960s brought 
an increased emphasis on stall avoidance, because 
stall recovery in such aircraft can be difficult or 
impossible (Federal Aviation Administration, 2004).  
Stick “pushers” installed on such airplanes were 
designed to lower the nose before critical angle of 
attack was exceeded, and artificial stall warning 
systems were required to be calibrated to activate at 
least five knots above stick pusher activation 
thresholds.  Additional stall protection measures were 
developed in the late 20th century as manufacturers 
of fly-by-wire transport category airplanes with 
                         
2 This requirement is reduced to 3 knots or 3 percent 
above stall speed when flying straight and level at 
idle power. 
integrated autoflight systems developed flight 
envelope protection systems to prevent airplanes 
from exceeding high or low airspeed limitations.  Full 
authority envelope protection systems, such as those 
installed on the Airbus A320, were made capable of 
increasing engine power and even modulating the 
effects of pilot control inputs to prevent exceedence 
of the critical angle of attack (Vakil, 2000). 
 
The Safety Gap 
 
Despite advances in the state of the art in stall 
avoidance and protection systems, many small to 
medium-sized commercial turboprop and turbine 
engine airplanes in use today still rely solely on flight 
crew monitoring and artificial stall warnings to avoid 
low airspeed-related accidents.  This approach is 
problematic for two reasons.  First, flying involves 
the time-sharing of multiple concurrent tasks, many 
of which require flight crews to monitor multiple 
displays. These tasks cannot always be performed 
simultaneously.  For this reason, successful flying 
depends on effective prioritization and visual 
scanning strategies (Wickens, 2003).  The process by 
which flight crews allocate their attentional resources 
among concurrent flying tasks has been called 
“cockpit task management” (Funk, 1991).  Crews 
must ensure that important flying tasks, such as 
airspeed monitoring, receive adequate attention at 
appropriate times and are not pre-empted by lower 
priority tasks.  Research has shown that pilots are 
generally good at doing this.  However, a variety of 
evidence indicates that suboptimal cockpit task 
management does sometimes occur and can have a 
negative impact on safety (Wickens, 2003).  Of 
interest to the topic at hand, the authors of one early 
study of flight crew performance in a full mission 
flight simulation cited violations of airspeed 
limitations (both high and low) as one of the most 
common types of flying errors made by three-pilot 
airline crews (Ruffel Smith, 1979). 
 
A second problem with relying on pilot monitoring 
and stall warnings for stall avoidance has to do with 
characteristics of the stall warning itself.  In theory, 
stall warnings are designed so that flight crews can 
prevent a stall by responding quickly to the 
occurrence of a stall warning.  Current airworthiness 
requirements for transport category airplanes even 
state that it must be possible for a test pilot to prevent 
a stall during powered 1.5 G banked turns when stall 
recovery is delayed for at least one second after the 
onset of a stall warning.  However, certain 
combinations of power changes and abrupt 
maneuvering (such as a level-off at MDA with or 
without structural icing) could reduce this margin of 
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warning.  Moreover, stall warnings can be unreliable 
because of ice accumulation, which raises stall speed 
and can degrade warning margins to the point where 
little or no warning is provided.  This phenomenon 
was noted during the investigation of a 1997 accident 
near Monroe, Michigan that caused the deaths of 29 
people, and led the Safety Board to recommend that 
the FAA apply more stringent certification 
requirements to airplanes certified for operation in 
icing conditions (National Transportation Safety 
Board, 1998). 
 
Low Airspeed / Stall Events 
 
In light of known human monitoring weaknesses and 
the potential inadequacy of artificial stall warnings, it 
should come as no surprise that the Safety Board has 
investigated numerous accidents and incidents 
involving flight crew failure to monitor and maintain 
airspeed.  In some cases, loss of airspeed / stall 
events have been preceded by aggravating factors 
such as aircraft equipment or system failures that 
made airspeed monitoring and maintenance more 
difficult.  Weather has also been an important 
contributing factor for low-airspeed related events.  
Aerodynamic stalls have occurred following 
encounters with wind, turbulence, and convective 
phenomena such as wind shear or microburst.  
However, structural icing may be the most common 
contributing factor. 
 
Events involving flight crew failures to monitor 
airspeed can occur during any phase of flight, as the 
following example attests.  On June 4, 2002, a Spirit 
Airlines McDonnell Douglas MD-82 on a scheduled 
Part 121 flight from Denver, Colorado to Ft. 
Lauderdale, Florida experienced an aerodynamic stall 
while cruising at 33,000 feet on autopilot.  Fifteen 
minutes into the cruise phase of flight, the crew felt a 
sudden vibration, heard the stick shaker and stall 
warning activate, noticed that their airspeed was low 
and their engines were operating at a very low power 
setting.  They also noticed that one engine’s 
temperature was too high.  The captain took manual 
control of the airplane and shut down the hot engine.  
Shortly thereafter, power rolled back on the good 
engine as well.  The flight crew managed to restore 
power to both engines at 17,000 feet, and made a 
precautionary landing.  The Safety Board found that 
the airplane’s engine inlet probes had become 
blocked by ice crystals resulting in a false engine 
pressure ratio indication and subsequent retarding of 
the throttles by the auto throttle system.  The Board 
attributed the probable cause of this incident to the 
flight crew’s failure to verify the engine instrument 
indications and power plant controls while on 
autopilot with the auto throttles engaged, and their 
failure to recognize the drop in airspeed which led to 
an aerodynamic stall associated with the reduction in 
engine power (Safety Board No. CHI02IA151). 
 
The authors searched records contained in the Safety 
Board’s Aviation Accident/Incident Database, 
looking specifically for low-airspeed events in the 
approach and landing phases of flight where 
equipment failure was not cited as a contributing 
factor.  This search identified 40 low airspeed-related 
events since 1982.  It is likely that additional cases of 
hard landings and tail strikes have occurred but gone 
unreported because they did not result in substantial 
damage.  The events identified were categorized by 
type of operation (Part 121 versus Part 135) and by 
involvement of structural icing (icing versus non-
icing).  The results of this categorization are shown in 
Figure 1.  This categorization indicates that low-
airspeed events during approach and landing 
occurred more often during Part 135 than Part 121 
flight operations.  The results also underscore the 
prevalence of structural icing in such events.  
However, that at least 19 of the low-airspeed related 
accidents and incidents identified did not involve 



















Figure 1. Accidents and incidents during approach 
or landing citing low airspeed, 1982-2004. 
 
Most of the low-airspeed related non-icing events 
involving Part 121 flight operations resulted in hard 
landings and/or tail strikes causing substantial aircraft 
damage, and none resulted in serious injuries.  
During one typical incident, reported in 1996, the 
Part 121 airline captain of a McDonnell-Douglas 
MD-88 said he flew a normal, stabilized approach, 
using normal flaps and a landing reference speed of 
133 knots plus 5 knots.  He reported flaring the 
airplane over the runway and realizing that the sink 
rate was not being arrested as desired.  The captain 
said he made a more “aggressive” pull on the control 
yoke while advancing the thrust levers.  The airplane 
landed hard, sustaining substantial damage.  Digital 
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flight data recorder readout disclosed that airspeed 
remained above 138 knots until, at an absolute 
altitude of 238 feet, airspeed began steadily 
decreasing below that speed.  When the airplane 
touched down on the runway, airspeed was 125 knots 
and pitch attitude was 10.6 degrees nose up.  There 
was a +5.5 G vertical acceleration spike at 
touchdown (Safety Board No. FTW96LA111). 
 
By contrast, low-airspeed related non-icing events 
involving Part 135 flight operations resulted in more 
severe outcomes.  Records of the investigations of 
these events indicate that fatal injuries occurred in 
approximately 1 out of every 4 cases.  Part 135 flight 
operations typically utilize smaller aircraft with less 
sophisticated autoflight systems.  They are less likely 
to be equipped with auto throttles or sophisticated 
envelope protection systems.  Also, Part 135 flight 
crews are often less experienced than Part 121 flight 
crews, and Part 135 flight operations have less 
stringent flight crew training requirements.  These 
factors could explain the higher prevalence of such 
events in Part 135 flight operations, and the relative 
severity of their outcomes. 
 
The Safety Board investigated an accident in 1994, 
involving a Jetstream 41 on a scheduled Part 135 
commuter flight, which crashed 1.2 nautical miles 
short of the runway during an ILS approach to the 
Port Columbus International Airport, Columbus 
Ohio, killing 5 and injuring 2 on board.  The flight 
crew initiated the landing checklist late in the 
approach.  The delay caused distractions to both 
pilots, and the approach was unstabilized.  The 
autopilot was engaged during the approach, and it 
kept the airplane on the localizer and glide slope.  
However, power was set too low to maintain 
airspeed.  This airplane was not equipped with 
autothrottles.  The flight crew did not adequately 
monitor airspeed indications, and the airplane 
decelerated until it stalled.  Although a stall warning 
was heard, the captain failed to execute appropriate 
stall recovery procedures, and the airplane descended 
steeply, impacting a building.  Icing was found not to 
have been a factor in the accident.  The Board found 
the probable cause of this accident to be, in part, “an 
aerodynamic stall that occurred when the flight crew 
allowed the airspeed to decay to stall speed following 
a very poorly planned and executed approach 
characterized by an absence of procedural discipline” 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 1994). 
 
A Change in Design Philosophy 
 
The introduction of a new kind of low-airspeed alert 
associated with the minimum operationally 
acceptable speed for a particular phase of flight could 
help flight crews maintain airspeed awareness in 
much the same way that altitude alert systems now 
help flight crews maintain altitude awareness.  Such a 
system would provide an earlier cue to flight crews 
about low and decreasing airspeed prior to the 
occurrence of a stall warning, providing them with 
more time to manage a potential problem before it 
becomes an emergency. 
 
Recommending a requirement for this kind of low-
airspeed alert system represents a departure from the 
previously accepted premise that adequate low-
airspeed awareness is provided by flight crew 
vigilance and existing stall warnings.  However, the 
history of accidents involving flight crew lack of 
low-airspeed awareness suggests that flight crew 
vigilance and existing stall warnings are inadequate 
to prevent hazardous low-airspeed situations.  
Moreover, the accident record suggests that this 
safety issue is not limited to autopilot operations or 
flight in icing conditions. 
 
The introduction of a low airspeed alerting system 
could prevent low airspeed / stall related accidents.  
If a low-airspeed alert had been installed on the King 
Air involved in the Eveleth accident and had 
activated when airspeed dropped below 1.2 VS (about 
92 knots), the flight crew could have received about 
15 seconds advance warning before the airplane 
decelerated to its stalling speed.  This might have 
directed the crew’s attention to the airplane’s 
decaying airspeed in time to initiate appropriate 
corrective action.  Moreover, if such a system could 
helped the crew maintain airspeed at or above a 
minimum operational thresholds such as 1.2 VS, the 
likelihood of an accelerated stall initiated by abrupt 
last-second maneuvering could have been reduced, 
and improved margins above stalling speed during 
flight under icing conditions could have been more 
reliably maintained. 
 
The nature of the airspeed monitoring task varies 
depending on the level of automation in an airplane 
cockpit.  During a manually flown, a pilot is actively 
engaged in balancing airspeed, pitch, power, and 
vertical speed in closed-loop fashion.  This requires 
frequent checking of the outside visual picture and 
the flight instruments to guide control movements.  
Alternatively, a pilot using the fully integrated 
autoflight system in a modern transport airplane 
monitors flight parameters, including airspeed, in a 
more supervisory fashion.  The issue of airspeed 
awareness for crews using highly automated flight 
management systems was raised in an FAA Human 
Factors Team Report (Federal Aviation 
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Administration, 1996).  Expressing concern about a 
history of accidents involving lack of low-airspeed 
awareness among flight crews monitoring automated 
systems, the report stated: 
 
Transport category airplanes are required to 
have adequate warnings of an impending stall, 
but at this point the airplane may already be in 
a potentially hazardous low energy state. 
Better awareness is needed of energy state 
trends such that flight crews are alerted prior 
to reaching a potentially hazardous low energy 
state. 
 
The need for better low airspeed protection and 
alerting was also cited by the FAA’s Flight Guidance 
System (FGS) Harmonization Working Group of the 
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee, when, in 
March 2002, it proposed revisions to 14 C.F.R. Part 
25.1329 and associated Advisory Circular 25.1329 to 
require low-airspeed protection and alerting during 
autopilot operations for newly certified transport-
category airplanes.  The proposal stated: 
 
The requirement for speed protection is based 
on the premise that reliance on flight crew 
attentiveness to airspeed indications, alone, 
during FGS…operation is not adequate to 
avoid unacceptable speed excursions outside 
the speed range of the normal flight 
envelope….Standard stall warning and high 
speed alerts are not always timely enough for 
the flight crew to intervene to prevent 
unacceptable speed excursions during FGS 
operation….A low speed alert and a transition 
to the speed protection mode at approximately 
1.2 VS, or an equivalent speed defined in 
terms of Vsr, for the landing flap configuration 
has been found to be acceptable.   
 
The changes proposed for Part 25.1329 were aimed at 
future transport category aircraft.  However, it may 
be feasible to develop low airspeed alert systems for 
less sophisticated, existing airplanes as well.  
Moreover, the FAA’s work, in combination with the 
Safety Board’s accident and incident findings, 
suggest a need for low airspeed alerting throughout a 
variety of aircraft with a range of automated features.  
A low airspeed alert was recently developed for 
Embraer EMB-120 turboprop airplanes for use in 
icing conditions.  This low airspeed alert system 
activates an amber-colored indicator light installed in 
the control panel and provides an auditory alert when 
airspeed drops below the minimum operational icing 
speed.  In addition, several avionics manufacturers 
offer low airspeed alerting devices for use in a broad 
array of general aviation airplanes.  These 
developments suggest that it may be feasible to 
develop low airspeed alerting systems for most 
airplane types. 
 
In a letter to the Safety Board dated April 12, 2004, 
the FAA said it would study cases involving low 
airspeed awareness that had been identified by the 
Safety Board and determine what action should be 
taken.  The FAA described existing requirements for 
stick shakers and stall warnings in transport category 
airplanes, and cited the increasing prevalence of 
color-coded visual displays of airspeed found in 
many modern cockpits.  The FAA also stated that it 
would consider addressing the issue of low airspeed 
awareness in efforts in progress under its Safer Skies 
programs and other initiatives.  However, as of 
February 2005, the FAA had not yet announced 
activities specifically aimed at addressing this issue. 
 
Human Factors Concerns 
 
Technical, operational, and human factors issues 
must be carefully evaluated and addressed in 
connection with the design and implementation of 
any new cockpit alerting system (Pritchett, 2001).  
Some issues that deserve consideration in association 
with the possible introduction of new low airspeed 
alerting systems include: the integration of this 
system with other aircraft systems; the determination 
of appropriate threshold speeds for alert activation; 
examination of the impact of the system’s reliability 
on flight crew confidence in the system; the selection 
of appropriate strategies for differentiating the alert 
from existing cockpit alerts and warnings; the 
development of appropriate flight crew procedures 
for use in conjunction with the system; and the need 
for flight crew training in use of the system and 
related procedures. 
 
Clearly there are many concerns associated with the 
possible introduction of these systems in commercial 
airplanes.  Despite these concerns, it is possible such 
systems could significantly improve flight crew 
performance and increase safety.  This is a matter the 
aviation psychology community is well suited to 
address.  Moreover, the aviation psychology research 
community has a long history of suggesting and 
evaluating alternative design solutions for new 
aircraft systems through applied research. 
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NTSB Case Numbers for Low Airspeed / Stall 
Related Events During Approach and Landing3 
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ATCS AGE AND EN ROUTE OPERATIONAL ERRORS: A RE-INVESTIGATION 
 
Dana Broach 
FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (AAM-520) 
P.O. Box 25082, Oklahoma City, OK  73125 
 
Public Law 92-297 requires that air traffic control specialists (ATCSs), hired on or after May 16, 1972, retire at age 
56. This law is based on testimony given in 1971 that as controllers aged, the cumulative effects of stress, fatigue 
(from shift work), and age-related cognitive changes created a safety risk (U.S. House of Representatives, 1971). 
The hypothesis has been considered in two studies of en route operational errors (OEs) with contradictory results 
(Center for Naval Analyses Corporation (CNAC), 1995; Broach, 1999). The purpose of this re-investigation was to 
test the hypothesis that controller age, controlling for experience, was related to the occurrence of OEs using a 
statistical method appropriate for rare events. A total of 3,054 usable en route OE records were extracted from the 
FAA OE database for the period FY1997 through FY2003 and matched with air route traffic control center 
(ARTCC) non-supervisory controller staffing records, resulting in a database of 51,898 records. Poisson regression 
was used to model OE count as a function of the explanatory variables age and experience using the SPSS® version 
11.5 General Loglinear (GENLOG) procedure. The Poisson regression model fit the data poorly (Likelihood Ratio 
χ2 = 283.81, p < .001). The odds of OE involvement, estimated with the Generalized Log Odds Ratio, for older 
controllers (GE age 56) were 1.02 times greater than the odds for younger (LE age 55) controllers, with a 95% 
confidence interval of 0.42 to 1.64. The range of odds indicated that neither age group was less or more likely to be 
involved in an OE, controlling for experience. This analysis does not support the hypothesis that older en route 
controllers are at greater risk of involvement in an OE. This finding suggests that the original rationale for the 
mandatory retirement of ATCSs may need to be re-evaluated. Additional research is recommended.
Public Law 92-297 requires that Air Traffic Control 
Specialists (ATCSs), hired on or after May 16, 1972 
by the FAA, retire at age 561. Controllers with 
“exceptional skills and abilities” may be given a 
waiver and continue working until reaching the 61st 
birthday. The primary evidence offered in support of 
the mandatory retirement of ATCSs at age 56 in 1971 
consisted of anecdotal reports of stress from 
controllers, studies of self-reported “stress-related” 
symptoms, physiological correlates of stress, and 
medical disability retirements of controllers. Despite 
strong assertions made by various parties, no 
testimony or data were presented in 1971 to 
demonstrate that older controllers were more likely 
than younger controllers to make errors that might 
compromise the safety of flight.  
 
Several studies of ATCS age and performance have 
been conducted since passage of P.L. 92-297 (see 
Broach & Schroeder, in press, for a review). A 
variety of measures of job performance have been 
examined in research, ranging from over-the-
shoulder subjective evaluations to computer-based 
measures. Three studies focused specifically on 
operational errors (OEs). An OE results when an 
ATCS fails to maintain appropriate separation 
between aircraft, terrain, and other obstacles to safe 
flight. OEs are rare compared to the number of 
operations handled in the U.S. air traffic system. For 
example, there were 1,145 OEs in fiscal year (FY) 
2000 compared to 166,669,557 operations, or 6.8 
OEs per million operations (Pounds & Ferrante, 
2003; DOT Inspector General, 2003a). Despite their 
rarity, OEs may pose safety risks, depending on the 
degree to which separation is lost, and are critical 
safety indicators for the operation of the air traffic 
control system (Department of Transportation 
Inspector General, 2003a,b). OEs occur when 
through a controller’s actions (or inaction), less than 
standard separation is maintained. 
 
Spahn (1977) investigated the relationship of age to 
System Errors (now called Operational Errors) and 
concluded that “no age group has neither more nor 
less than its proportional share of system errors” (p. 
3-35). The Center for Naval Analyses Corporation 
(CNAC) found in 1995 that the likelihood of an OE 
in the period January 1991 to July 1995 declined 
dramatically in the first few years at an air route 
traffic control center (ARTCC) and then appeared to 
approach a constant value. However, CNAC did not 
examine controller age nor control for age effects. 
Broach (1999) re-analyzed the CNAC data set from 
the perspective of controller age and found that the 
likelihood of an OE might increase with age. The 
regression analysis also found that experience might 
mitigate the risk of an OE associated with increasing 
age. Additional research on the relationship of 
chronological age, experience, and OEs was 
recommended. The present study builds on that 
recommendation. This study was designed to test the 
hypothesis that older controllers were more likely 
than younger controllers to commit errors that 






A total of 3,054 usable en route OE records were 
extracted from the FAA Operational Error/Deviation 
System (OEDS) for the period FY1997 through 
FY2003. Records for controllers employed at 
ARTCCs were extracted from the FAA Consolidated 
Personnel Management Information System (CPMIS) 
for each fiscal year. There was one CPMIS record in 
a year for each controller. The OE and CPMIS 
records were matched by controller identifier and 
year, producing a database with 51,898 matched 
records. The number of ATCS with and without OEs 
is presented by fiscal year in Table 1. For example, of 
the 7,178 non-supervisory ATCS stationed at 
ARTCCs in FY1997, 6,864 (95.6%) had no 
operational errors, while 303 controllers (4.2%) had 
one OE, and 11 had 2 errors (0.2%). No ATCS had 3 




Both CNAC (1995) and Broach (1999) calculated the 
dependent variable of interest as the ratio of 
controllers with errors in an experience or age range 
to the total number of controllers in that experience 
or age range. CNAC labeled this ratio as the 
“likelihood” of involvement in an error. In fact, both 
CNAC and Broach calculated the proportion of 
controllers in a given category that were involved in 
an error at a given point in time, that is, the 
prevalence rate. The result is a person-based estimate 
of risk. However, a person-based estimate of risk 
does not take into account the varying degrees of 
exposure between controllers. For example, a 
controller working a busy, low-altitude transitional 
sector with multiple merging airways that feed a 
major hub during an afternoon rush will have a 
greater opportunity to commit an OE than another 
controller working a high-altitude sector with sparse 
cross-continental traffic in steady, predictable 
east/west flows. Time on position may vary as well. 
For example, a controller working longer on a given 
position will have greater opportunity to commit an 
OE than another controller working less time on a 
position. As noted by Della Rocco, Cruz, and 
Clemens (1999), a measure of exposure is required to 
analyze the risk of being involved in an OE 
appropriately. However, such measures were 
unavailable for the present study, leaving the count of 
errors and prevalence as the variables of interest. 
 
Analysis of counts, such as the number of OEs 
committed by a controller during a specified period 
of time, poses analytic challenges. Events such as 
OEs are rare, compared to the number of operations 
in the air traffic control system, the number of hours 
worked by controllers, or even the number of 
controllers working. While rare events such as OEs 
are important because of their signal value and 
potential costs, they are also difficult to study (Hulin 
& Rousseau, 1980). Techniques borrowed from 
epidemiology such as count-oriented regression have 
proven useful in the analysis of rare events. Poisson 
regression, a count-oriented regression technique, 
was used in the present study to investigate the 





Poisson regression is a statistical technique used to 
model the expected count of some event as a function 
of one or more explanatory variables. Examples of 
events that follow a Poisson distribution are doctor 
visits, absenteeism in the workplace, mortgage pre-
payments and loan defaults, bank failures, insurance 
claims, and airplane accidents (Cameron & Trivedi, 
p. 11). In statistics, the “law of rare events” states that 
the total number of events of interest will take, 
approximately, the Poisson distribution if (a) the 
event may occur in any of a large number of trials, 
but (b) the probability of occurrence in any given trial 
is small (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). This statistical 
“law of rare events” might apply to air traffic control 
operations as well: there are a large number of 
aircraft under the control of a relatively large number 
of controllers at any given moment, but the likelihood 
of an OE for any given aircraft by any single 
controller is very small. In this application, the 
analytic goal was to model the number of OEs 
incurred by a controller as a function of age and 




The data for this analysis consisted of the 51,899 
records for non-supervisory center controllers with 
and without OEs for the period FY1997 through 
FY2003 (see Table 1). Tenure was recoded into 
discrete categories to simplify the analysis. The first 
category for tenure was based on the average of about 
three years required to complete on-the-job training 
for center controllers (Manning, 1998). The next 
interval was 6-years wide (4 through 9), followed 
five-year increments (Table 2). Age was recoded into 
two groups: age 55 and younger; and age 56 and 
older. This split was used to specifically assess the 
risk that might be associated with controllers older 
than the mandatory separation age. 
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Table 1: N non-supervisory en route ATCS on-board with 0, 1, 2, or 3 operational errors by fiscal year 
 N ATCS with Operational Errors (OEs)  
Fiscal Year 0 1 2 3 AOB Total 
1997 6,864 303 11 0 7,178 
1998 6,932 389 16 0 7,337 
1999 6,869 422 21 0 7,312 
2000 6,833 487 31 0 7,351 
2001 6,827 549 45 1 7,422 
2002 7,110 416 32 0 7,558 
2003 7,410 313 17 1 7,741 
 
Table 2: Tenure by age cross-classification table for Poisson regression analysis 
 Number of OEs (nij)  ATCS Population (Nij) 
Tenure Group LE Age 55 GE Age 56  LE Age 55 GE Age 56 
LE 3 Years 44  4  3,587 110 
4 – 9 Years 488 10  7,574 191 
10 – 14 Years 1,112 20  15,758 280 
15 – 19 Years 1,007 2  14,816 128 
20 – 24 Years 343 2  5,615 67 
GE 25 Years 142 57  2,587 1,186 
 
The data were aggregated by fiscal year, age group, 
and tenure group to create a cross-classification table 
suitable for Poisson regression, as shown in Table 2. 
The columns labeled “Number of OEs (nij)” contain 
the counts of OEs reported for each age and tenure 
group combination. For example, there were 44 OEs 
in the period FY1997 to FY2003 for controllers age 
55 or less and with 3 years or less tenure, and 4 OEs 
for controllers age 56 or older and with 3 years or 
less tenure. The columns labels “ATCS Population 
(Nij)” contain data representing the number of 
controllers “exposed” to the risk of incurring an OE 
during the observation period for each age-tenure 
combination. For example, there were 3,587 records 
for en route controllers age 55 or less with 3 years or 
less tenure who were “at risk” of incurring an OE 
during the observation period. The goal of the 
regression analysis is to assess the relative effects of 
age and tenure on the ratios of errors to “at risk” 
population. The SPSS® version 11.5 General 
Loglinear (GENLOG; SPSS, 1999) method was used 






The initial analyses consisted of simple descriptive 
statistics. First, the number of OEs per age group for 
the observation period (FY1997 through 2003) was 
examined, as shown in Table 2. In this analysis, each 
controller could have as many as seven records, one 
for each fiscal year. The records were pooled and 
then broken out by the number of OEs reported for 
that age group across the 7 years of observation. As 
shown in Tables 2, most controllers were not 
involved in an operational error during the 7-year 
period. Moreover, the error distribution appears to be 
similar to the distribution of age, that is, more errors 
are observed for the more populous age groups. The 
distribution of controllers with no and one or more 
OEs by age group is illustrated in Figure 1, relative to 
the age distribution for all non-supervisory enroute 
controllers. As found by Spahn in 1977, the 
distribution of errors by age was very similar to the 
distribution of age across controllers. No particular 
age group appeared to experience OEs at a rate 





Overall, the Poisson regression model fit the data 
poorly (Likelihood Ratio χ2 = 283.81, p < .001). The 
parameter estimate for the main effect of age (3.50) 
was significantly different from 0 (with a 95% 
confidence interval of 3.29 – 3.70), as were the 
parameter estimates for tenure. To consider the effect 
of age across tenure, the two age groups were 











OE>=1 4.8 19.6 34.2 24.3 8.8 5.3 2.2 0.7
OE=0 8.0 18.7 30.7 22.9 9.6 6.1 3.1 0.8
Total ATCS 7.9 18.8 30.9 23.0 9.6 6.1 3.0 0.8
LE 30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 GE 61
 
Figure 1: OE Involvement by age group compared to distribution of age for all ARTCC controllers, FY1997-2003 
 
used to estimate the odds ratio for age, that is, the odds 
of OE involvement for older (GE age 56) controllers 
(see SPSS, 1999, p. 202 – 203). The odds of OE 
involvement for older controllers (GE age 56) were 
1.02 times greater than the odds for younger (LE age 
55) controllers, with a 95% confidence interval of 0.42 
to 1.64. A confidence interval for the odds ratio that 
includes 1.0 indicates that the odds of involvement for 
the two groups are equal: neither age group was less or 




The Poisson regression analysis did not support the 
hypothesis that the likelihood of involvement in an en 
route OE increased with age. This finding 
undermines the explicit assertion that early retirement 
of controllers was “primarily a safety measure” 
(Testimony of Donald Francke, U.S. House of 
Representatives, 1971). As noted by Li, Baker, 
Grabowski, Qiang, McCarthy and Rebok (2003), age 
in and of itself may have little bearing on safety-
related outcomes if factors such as individual job 
experience, workload, traffic complexity, and time-
on-position are taken into consideration (p. 878). For 
example, supervisors may assign older controllers to 
less difficult sectors or provide assign an assistant 
controller during periods of heavy traffic. All other 
things being equal, age may influence performance 
through two conflicting pathways. On the one hand, 
the inevitable changes in cognitive function, 
particularly speed of processing, may result in slower 
and less efficient performance. On the other hand, 
experience is gained with age, and compensatory 
strategies and meta-strategies may result in safer and 
more efficient performance by controllers. Additional 
research on OEs, age, and ATCS performance is 
recommended to extend and confirm the findings of 
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1Mandatory separation is not required for controllers 
hired before May 16, 1972. The number of 
controllers age 56 and older increased from 155 in 
FY1997 to 488 in FY2003. 
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